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THE PERSISTENCE OF EARNINGS AND 

COPORA TE GOVERNANCE IN IPO FIRMS 

Mary F. Calegari San Jose State University 
Maretno A. Harjoto San Jose State University 
• In this study, we investigate the earnings persistence in !PO firms by examining the two components ofearnings: accruals 
and cash flows. We also analyze the impact of corporate governance structure on earnings and the two earnings 
components. In our comparison of the top and bottom quartiles based on the firms' earnings at the !PO year, we find that 
although the top quartile firms have a significantly positive accrual component in the !PO year, they eventually have the 
same negative accrual component ofearnings as the bottom quartile firms in the second year after the !PO. In contrast, we 
find that the significant difference in the cash flow component between the top and bottom quartiles persists during the two 
years after the !PO. This finding supports the existing literature that the cash flow component contributes to the persistence 
of earnings while the accrual component does not. We also find that the corporate governance structure has a significant 
impact on earnings and the components ofearnings for the top quartile firms, but not for the bottom quartile firms . This is 
particularly evident since the top quartile firms have the opportunity to manage their earnings, while firms in the lowest 
quartile are unable to manage their earnings. 
Introduction 
The notion of "earnings quality" - the degree to which 
reported earnings reflects the true operational health of a 
business - has long been of interest to both academics and 
fin ancial practitioners. Prior research shows that firms with 
persistent earnings are assigned a greater value in their 
securities [Kormendi and Lipe 1987, Collins and Kothari 
1989, Ali and Zarowin 1992]. Therefore, earnings 
persistence should reflect a higher quality of earnings. 
Th ese studies use statistically motivated models in 
etermining their measure of earnings persistence. Sloan 
(1 996), on the other hand, employs a model that relies on 
e characteristics of the underlying accounting process. 
He decomposes earnings into its accrual and cash flow 
components and finds that current earnings is less likely to 
persist into the future if it is attributable primarily to the 
accrual component of earnings as opposed to the cash flow 
component. 
Research in the area of earnings management find that 
firms can manipulate reported earnings through the accrual 
component. Firms can report earnings in excess of cash 
flows by taking positive accruals. However, high earnings 
due to large positive accruals will not persist into the future 
and, therefore, lowering the quality of the firm's earnings 
reporting process (Sloan 1996]. 
The initial public offering (IPO) process is particularly 
susceptible to earnings management, offering entrepreneurs 
both motivation and opportunities to manage earnings. 
Managing earnings through accruals rather than making 
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real efforts to maintain earnings persistence through cash 
flows is considered an agency problem. An agency 
problem occurs when management's actions and the 
interest of the shareholders become misaligned. This 
agency problem is exacerbated in IPO firms. When a firm 
goes public, the number of non-manager shareholders 
increases, therefore decreasing the manager's incentive to 
maximize the firm's value. Prior research fmds that 
corporate governance mechanisms can mitigate this agency 
problem [Beasley 1996, Dechow et al. 1996, Yermack 
1996, Core et al. 1999, Klein 2002, Reitenga and Tearney 
2003]. 
Given this background, the purpose of this study is 
twofold: First, we investigate the persistence of earnings in 
IPO firms by examining the accrual and cash flow 
components of earnings. Second, we analyze the impact of 
corporate governance mechanisms (specifically, board 
structure, ownership concentration, and CEO 
characteristics) on earnings and the two earnings 
components. 
Literature Review 
Accrual and Cash Flow Components of Earnings. 
Financial statement analysis textbooks emphasize the 
importance of analyzing the accrual and cash components 
of current earnings in the assessment of future earnings 
persistence. Cash flow from operations is less susceptible 
to distortion than net income. The accrual-based net 
income number relies on accruals, deferrals, allocations and 
valuations, which all involve a higher degree of subjectivity 
than what enters into the determination of cash flow from 
operations [Bernstein 1993]. Although both components 
contribute to current earnings, high performance that is 
attributable to the cash flow component of earnings is more 
likely to persist than high performance that is attributable to 
the accrual component of earnings [Sloan 1996]. 
Earnings Management in IPO Firms. Practitioners 
emphasize the role of accounting information in investment 
and lending decisions by stockholders and creditors as a 
major motivation for earnings manipulation. For example, 
Kellogg and Kellogg ( 1991) state that the first two reasons 
for fraud, misrepresentation, and manipulation in financial 
statements are: (1) to encourage investors to buy an interest 
in a company's stock as owners, or in bonds as creditors; 
and (2) to increase the value of the stock of present 
shareholders of the company. Similarly, the National 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (1993) states that 
the first reason why financial statement manipulation is 
committed is "to encourage investment through the sale of 
stock." This evidence suggests that IPO firms have a strong 
motivation to manipulate earnings. 
Initial public offerings tend to be made by relatively 
small firms with limited operating histories. Generally, a 
the time of the IPO, there is little publicly available 
information about these firms other than that contained in 
their prospectuses. Therefore, in evaluating an IPO firm's 
future prosp~cts, investors must rely heavily on the firm's 
disclosures made in the fmancial statements. This creates 
an informational asymmetry between the entrepreneur 
taking his firm public and potential investors. These 
conditions provide IPO firms with the opportunity to 
manipulate reported earnings. 
Teoh et al. (1998) examines the relation between the 
long-run post-IPO return underperformance and IPO firms ' 
earnings management. They find that IPO firms with 
higher discretionary accruals have poorer stock return 
performance in the subsequent three years. DuCharme et 
al. (2001) investigates the role of earnings management by 
issuers prior to making IPOs. Similar to earlier studies, 
they fmd that abnormal accruals during the offer year are 
significantly negatively related to subsequent firm stock 
returns. These studies only examine the relation between 
accruals and stock return performance. They do not 
consider the cash flow component of earnings, the 
subsequent performance of earnings, and the effect of 
corporate governance on earnings management. 
Corporate Governance Mechanisms. Internal coporate 
governance processes are established to maintain the 
credibility of firms' fmancial statements and safeguard 
against such behavior as earnings management. The board 
of directors is a crucial part of the corporate structure. The 
board provides the link between the providers of capital 
(shareholders) and those who use that capital to create value 
(managers). Fama (1980) theorizes that outside directors 
are essential to creating a board that will function as an 
effective monitor of management. Empirical evidence 
indicates that more independent board structures contribute 
to better monitoring of management and lead to better 
decision-making that follows shareholders' interests 
[Hochberg 2003, Reitenaga and Tearney 2003]. The major 
committees involved in the governance of the firm are the 
audit and compensation committees. The role of the audit 
committee includes preventing fraudulent accounting 
statements, as well as mediating disputes between 
management and outside auditors regarding the application 
of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. The 
compensation committee determines and reviews 
compensation packages for top management [Hochberg 
2003]. 
The ownership structure of the firm may also influence 
top management's financial reporting decisions. Since 
external blockholders have large shareholdings, they could 
become effective monitors, reducing the likelihood of 
earnings management [Reitenga and Tearney 2003]. 
Warfield et al. (1995) find that managerial ownership is 
positively related to the informativeness of accounting 
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earnings. They also find that the magnitude of discretionary 
accounting accrual adjustments is significantly higher when 
managerial ownership is low. This evidence suggests that 
managerial ownership mitigates earnings manipulation 
through accruals and increases earnings quality. 
Various CEO characteristics provide CEOs with the 
incentive and opportunity to manage earnings to their 
advantage. CEO tenure and whether the CEO is the founder 
of the company measures the relative power of the CEO. 
When the chairman of the board is the CEO, management is 
accountable to a body Jed by management. The CEO is then 
put in the position of evaluating his or her own 
performance, creating a clear conflict of interest. 
Contribution of the Study 
Our study contributes to the existing literature in three 
ways. First, our paper extends the current research by 
examining total earnings and both the accrual and cash flow 
components of earnings for IPO firms. By decomposing 
earnings into its accrual and cash flow components, we can 
ascertain which component is more susceptible to earnings 
management and influenced by corporate governance 
mechanisms. This differs from prior studies on earnings 
management in IPO firms since they focus only on the 
accrual component of earnings and its relation to 
subsequent stock return performance [Teoh et al. 1998, 
DuCharme et al. 200 1]. Second, we investigate the firms in 
the top and bottom quartile of earnings in the IPO year, and 
observe the persistence of earnings and its components in 
the first and second year following the IPO. The top 
quartile represents firms with high (strong) performance 
and the bottom quartile represents firms with poor (weak) 
performance. By separately analyzing these two sub­
samples, we can determine whether earnings and its 
components behave differently based on performance 
categories. Lastly, we focus our analysis on the significance 
of corporate governance on earnings, and the accrual and 
cash flow components of earnings, for the top and bottom 
quartiles of IPO firms . This enables us to detect whether 
there are any differences in the roles that corporate 
governance plays in these two groups of firms . 
Methodology 
Sample, Data, and Variables. The total number of IPOs 
reached its peak in 1996 and 1997. To maximize the size of 
our sample, we utilize the sample of firms that went public 
during the peak period of IPOs (1996-1997). Since we are 
interested in the evolution of earnings after the IPO, we 
require that these firms survive at least two consecutive 
years after its IPO year. 1 
The sample of IPO firms and information on the primary 
seasoned equity offering following the IPO are gathered 
from the Security bata Corporation (SDC) Global Issues 
database. Financial information about the firm is collected 
from the Compustat and the IPO prospectuses. The 
corporate governance data such as CEO and external 
blockholder ownership concentration, the board size and 
composition are·· manually collected from the Security 
Exchange Commissions (SEC) Edgar online. Additional 
information about the firm's age and the founder of the firm 
are obtained from proxy statements from the SEC Edgar 
online. 
The fmancial variables of interest in this study are 
earnings, accruals and cash from operations. Earnings is 
defined as operating income after depreciation . We select 
this definition because it excludes non-recurring items. The 
accrual component of earnings is computed using 
information from the balance sheet and income statement, 
which is common in the earnings management literature 
[Dechow et al. 1995, Sloan 1996]. 
Accruals= (L'iCA- L'iCash)- (L'iCL - L'iSTD- L'iTP)- Dep 
where, L'iCA = change in current assets, L'1Cash = change in 
cash/equivalents, L'iCL = change in current liabilities, L'iSTD 
= change in debt included in current liabilities, L'iTP = 
change in income taxes payable, and Dep = depreciation 
and amortization expense. Debt in current liabilities is 
excluded from accruals because it relates to financing 
transactions as opposed to operating transactions. Income 
taxes payable is also excluded from accruals for consistency 
with the definition of earnings employed in the empirical 
tests. The cash flow component of earnings is computed as 
the difference between earnings and the accrual component 
of earnings. This methodology is similar to that used by 
Sloan ( 1996). 
The empirical tests require cross-sectional and temporal 
comparisons of the magnitude of earnings performance and 
the relative magnitude of the accrual and cash flow 
components of earnings. Therefore, we standardize all 
three financial variables by firm size to facilitate the 
comparisons. We use total assets as our proxy for firm size, 
measured as the average of the beginning and end of year 
book value of total assets. The three financial variables we 
use in the empirical tests are defined as follows : 
Earnings Income from Continuing Operations 
Average Total Assets 
Accrual Accruals 
Component Average Total Assets 
Income from Continuing Operations ­
Cash Flow Accruals 
Component Average Total Assets 
The corporate governance variables we use in this study 
are as follows : (1) for board structure we use board size 
FALL2005 49 
(BODSIZE), percentage of outside directors 
(ODPCTBOD), size of audit committee (AUDCOM), and 
size of compensation committee (COMPCOM); (2) for 
ownership concentration we use percentage of external 
blockholder ownership (EXTBLOCK) and percentage of 
total CEO ownership, including restricted stock grants 
(TOTCEOWN); and (3) for CEO characteristics we use a 
dummy variable that equals one if the CEO is the chairman 
of the board and zero otherwise (CEOCHAIR), a dummy 
variable that equals one if the CEO is the founder of the 
firm and zero otherwise (CEOFOUND), and CEO tenure 
(CEOTENUR). 
Additionally, we control for the age of the company 
(YRFOUND), firm size (measured by the natural log of 
total assets) (LOGASSET)2 , and whether the firm conducts 
a primary seasoned equity offering (SEO). Older firms tend 
to be more established and exhibit stronger and more stable 
earnings performance. Larger firms benefit from 
economies of scale and thus become more efficient and 
profitable. SEO is an indicator variable taking the value of 
one if the firm conducts a seasoned equity offering since 
firms may manage earnings upwards prior to an SEO. 
We also include a time trend variable (TREND) in our 
analysis. Since we are interested in investigating the 
behavior of earnings, and its accrual and cash flow 
components, over the two years subsequent to the IPO, this 
time trend variable captures any changes over time in 
earnings and its components. 
Lastly, to control for any industry effects, we include 
dummy variables that equal one if the firm belongs to one 
of the two-digit SIC codes 10 through 87 and zero 
otherwise (SIC 1 0-87). 
Regression Equations. We investigate the relation 
between earnings, and its accrual and cash flow 
components, and corporate governance mechanisms 
through multiple regression analysis. We separately regress 
earnings (Equation 1), the accrual component (Equation 2), 
and the cash flow component (Equation 3) on the corporate 
governance and other control variables. The models are 
estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) with White's 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
Earningsit = flo + fl 1BODSIZE;, + fl20DPCTBODit + 
fl~UDCOMit + fl4COMPCOM;, + fl5EXTBLOCK1r + 
fl6TOTCEOWNit + fl,CEOCHAIRit + fl~~CEOFOUNDit + 
fl9CEOTENURit + fl 10 YRFOUND;, + fl 11 LOGASSETit + 
fl12SEO;, + flJJTREND + flu-4~1CI0-87 + eit (1) 
Accrua!Componentit =flo+ fl1BODSIZE;, + fl20DPCTBOD;, 
+ fl3AUDCOM;, + fl4COMPCOM;, + fl5EXTBLOCK1r + 
fl6TOTCEOWNit + flcCEOCHAJR;, + fl11CEOFOUNDit + 
fl9CEOTENURit + flJOYRFOUNDit + fl 11 LOGASSETit + 
fl12SEOit + fl 13 TREND + flu-4~ICJ0-87 + eit (2) 
CashF!owComponent;1 flo + + 
fl20DPCTBODit + fl~UDCOMit + fl4COMPCOM;, + 
fl5EXTBLOCK1r + fl6TOTCEOWN;, + fl~EOCHAIR;, + 
fl8CEOFOUNDu + fl9CEOTENURu + fl10 YRFOUND;, + 
fl11LOGASSETu + fl 12SE0u + fl 13TREND + flu-46SICJ0-87 
+ e;, (3) 
Descriptive Statistics. Table 1 presents the descriptive 
statistics of the overall sample and the firms in the top and 
bottom quartiles of earnings at the time of the IPO. The top 
quartile subsample is formed by choosing the firms that are 
in the top quartile of earnings at their IPO year. The bottom 
quartile subsample is formed by choosing the firms that are 
in the bottom quartile of earnings at their IPO year. 
There are no significant differences in the average board 
size, board structure, and size of the audit and 
compensation committees between the top and bottom 
quartiles. However, we observe a significant difference in 
the average external blockholders and CEO ownership 
between the top and bottom quartile firms. The firms in the 
top quartile tend to have a lower external blockholding and 
a higher CEO ownership compared to the bottom quartile. 
This evidence indicates that there are more differences in 
the ownership structure rather than the board structure 
between the top and bottom quartile firms. 
We also find that the CEOs in the top quartile firms are 
more likely to be appointed as chairman of the board and 
have longer tenure than the CEOs in the bottom quartile 
firms. The top quartile firms are also older and larger in 
asset size compared to the bottom quartile firms. This 
implies that firms in the top quartile are likely to be more 
established than the bottom quartile firms. 
Comparison of Top and Bottom Quartiles Ranked on 
Earnings in IPO Year. Table 2 reports the evolution of 
the · firms' earnings and its accrual and cash flow 
components in the IPO year, one year after the IPO, and 
two years after the IPO, for the full sample and the top and 
bottom quartile firms. Table 2 also presents the univariate 
test of means and medians (t-stat and Wilcoxon z-score) 
between the top and bottom quartiles based on earnings, the 
accrual component, and cash flow component. Earnings for 
the full sample decline during the two years subsequent to 
the IPO. Earnings for the top quartile firms are positive and 
significantly different from earnings for the bottom quartile 
firms in the IPO year. This difference persists after the IPO 
even though earnings for the top quartile firms decline 
during the two subsequent years. 
Similar to earnings, the accrual component for the full 
sample declines during the two years following the IPO. 
The accrual component for the top quartile is positive and 
significantly different from the bottom quartile. However, 
the accrual component for the top firms deteriorates and 
becomes negative and insignificantly different from the 
bottom firms in the second year after the IPO. This 
indicates that the top quartile firms with strong earnings due 
JOURNAL OF GLOBAL BUSINESS 50 
TABLE 1 

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 

Full Sample Bottom Quartile Top Quartile 
Variables Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
EARNINGS -0.066 0.054 -0.418 -0.375 0.152 0.15 
ACRRUAL -0.01 -0.024 -0.043 -0.031 0.044 0.02 
CASH FLOW -0.056 0.022 -0.375 -0.366 0.108 0.124 
BODSIZE 6.682 6 6.642 6.5 6.726 7 
ODPCTBOD 72.146 75 75.711 80 70.065 71.43 
AUDCOM 2 .595 3 2.559 3 2.655 3 
COMPCOM 2.654 3 2.524 2 2.655 3 
EXTBLOCK 22 .983 20.1 27 .539 30.25 16.684 12.15 
TOTCEOWN 13.253 6.02 10.546 5.416 20.274 12.701 
CEOCHAIR 0.495 0 0.381 0 0.583 0 
CEO FOUND 0.396 0 0.452 0 0.464 0 
CEOTENUR 4.9 4 4.464 4 6.988 5 
YRFOUND 9.196 7 6.892 6 13.19 13 
LOG ASSET 4.305 4.063 3.726 3.55 4.615 4 .591 
SEQ 0.112 0 0.095 0 0.166 0 
Total firms Ill 28 28 
Observations 321 84 84 
TABLE2 

COMPARISON OF TOP AND BOTTOM QUARTILES 

RANKED ON EARNINGS IN IPO YEAR 

Panel A. Earnings 
Full Sample Bottom Quartile Top Quartile Wilcoxon 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median t-stat z-score 
IPO year -0 .02 0.065 -0.421 -0.391 0.223 0.184 -11.89*** -6.42*** 
First year -0.056 0.038 -0.411 -0.323 0.146 0.14 -7 .05*** -5 .86*** 
Second year -0.081 0.021 -0.423 -0.38 0.088 0.121 -5.50*** -5 .01 *** 
Panel ~ . Accrual Component 
Full Sample Bottom Quartile Top Quartile Wilcoxon 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median t-stat z-score 
IPO year 0.003 -0.019 -0.035 -0.03 0.072 0.024 -2 .76*** -2.32** 
First year -0 .009 -0.013 -0.082 -0.037 0.074 0.043 -3 .81 *** -3. 59*** 
Second year -0.023 -0.032 -0.011 -0.021 -0 .013 -0.032 0.15 0.28 
Panel C. Cash Flow Component 
Full Sample Bottom Quartile Top Quartile Wilcoxon 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median t-stat z-score 
lPO year -0 .035 0.043 -0.386 -0.396 0. 151 0.151 -8.41*** -5 .85*** 
First year -0 .059 0.01 3 -0 .328 -0.353 0.071 0.074 -5.35*** -5.03* ** 
Second year -0 .071 0.018 -0.411 -0.372 0.102 0.13 -5.47*** -5.09*** 
** p<0.05 ***p<O.OI 
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TABLE3 

MULTIPLE REGRESSION RESULTS FOR FULL SAMPLE 

Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 
Earnings Accrual Component Cash Flow Component 
Variables Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
BOD SIZE 0.0021 0.23 -0 .0013 -0.28 0.0034 0.37 
ODPCTBOD -0.0035 -2.54** -0.0017 -2.55** -0.0018 -1.33 
AUDCOM -0.1065 -2.00** -0 .0100 -0.59 -0.0965 -1.86* 
COMPCOM 0.0619 2.08** -0.0176 -1.25 0.0795 2.65*** 
EXTBLOCK 0.0008 0.93 0.0003 0.84 0.0005 0.59 
TOTCEOWN 0.0027 2.25** 0.0009 1.66 0.0019 1.47 
CEOCHAIR -0 .0346 -0.96 -0.0334 -1.94* -0.0012 -0.03 
CEO FOUND -0 .1307 -3.61 *** -0 .0229 -1.30 -0.1077 -2.96*** 
CEOTENUR 0.0150 3.71 *** 0.0048 2.59*** 0.0102 2.51** 
YRFOUND 0.0088 3.98*** 0.0002 0.21 0.0085 3.57*** 
LOGASSET 0.0546 3.19*** -0.0102 -1.58 0.0649 3.74*** 
SEO 0.0792 2.15** 0.0727 3.54*** 0.0064 0.18 
TREND -0 .0551 -3.02*** -0 .0121 -1.51 -0.0430 -2.33** 
INTERCEPT -0 .2506 -1.56 0.1272 1.21 -0 .3778 -2.06** 
R-square 0.50 0.32 0.47 
Total firms Ill 111 Ill 
Observations 321 321 321 
The estimated slope coefficients for the industry dummies (2-digit SIC) are not reported. 
* p < 0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<O.Ol 
to a higher accrual component at the IPO eventually have 
the same accruals as the firms with weak earnings in the 
second year after the IPO. This evidence implies that 
strong earnings at the IPO that are attributable to high 
accruals will not persist during the two years after the IPO. 
The cash flow component for the full sample has a slight 
downward trend , but not as much as earnings and accruals . 
The cash flow component for the top quartile is positive and 
significantly different from the bottom quartile. This 
difference persists during the two years after the IPO. 
When we examine the earnings and its components for the 
second year, we find that the top firms have a positive cash 
flow component but a negative accrual component 
indicating that the positive earnings at the second year is 
primarily attributable to the cash flow component of 
earnings. This implies that the cash flow component 
persists after the IPO. The overall findings indicate that the 
cash flow component tends to persist, while the accrual 
component does not persist during the two years after the 
IPO. 
Multiple Regression Results 
Multiple Regression Results for Full Sample. Table 3 
presents the multiple regression results for the full sample. 
We find that the percentage of outside directors 
(ODPCTBOD) is negatively related to total earnings (t=­
2.54, p<0.05) and the accrual component (t=-2.55, p<0.05) . 
IPO firms with a larger percentage of outside directors tend 
to have a lower accrual component and, therefore, result in 
lower total earnings. This signifies the importance of the 
outside directors' role in monitoring management from 
conducting earnings manipulation through accruals and 
maintaining the quality of earnings. 
We find that the number of audit committee members 
(AUDCOM) has a significant negative association with 
earnings (t=-2.00, p<0.05) and the cash flow component 
(t=-1.86, p<O.l ). This finding indicates that IPO firms with 
a higher number of audit committee members in their board 
tend to adopt more conservative cash flow reporting and , 
therefore , earnings reporting. On the other hand, the 
number of compensation committee members 
(COMPCOM) in the board has a significant positive 
relation with earnings (t=2.08, p<0.05) and cash flows 
(t=2 .65, p<0.01) . This evidence suggests that the audit 
committee has a different (opposite) role compared to the 
compensation committee in influencing management's 
reporting of earnings . 
In terms of ownership structure (EXTBLOCK AND 
TOTCEOWN), we only find a positive association between 
CEO ownership (TOTCEOWN) and total earnings (t=2 .25, 
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TABLE4 

MULTIPLE REGRESSION RESULTS FOR TOP QUARTILE SAMPLE 

Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 
Earnings Accrual Component Cash Flow Component 
Variables Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
BODSIZE 0.0208 1.04 0.0078 
ODPCTBOD -0.0036 -2.76*** -0.0080 
AUDCOM -0 .071I -2.02** 0.0793 
COMPCOM 0.1040 3.65*** -0.0513 
EXTBLOCK O.OOOI 0.07 -0 .0038 
TOTCEOWN -0.0001 -0.05 -0.0030 
CEOCHAIR -0.0368 -0.83 -0.0264 
CEO FOUND O.OI27 0.18 O.I004 
CEOTENUR 0.0077 1.53 -0 .0019 
YRFOUND 0.0034 0.93 -0.002I 
LOGASSET O.OI16 0.49 -0.0537 
SEO 0.0588 1.49 0.1I20 
TREND -0.0797 -3.7I *** -O.OI80 
INTERCEPT -0.0646 -0.28 0.7870 
R-square 0.56 0.66 
Total firms 28 28 
Observations 84 84 
The estimated slope coefficients for the industry dummies (2-digit SIC) are not reported. 
* p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p <0.01 
0.44 
-5.70*** 
1.71 * 
-1.88* 
-2.34** 
-1.68* 
-0.64 
1.50 
-0.55 
-0.93 
-1.89* 
3.75*** 
-1.03 
3.35*** 
0.0130 0.53 
0.0044 2 .69*** 
-0 .1504 -3.04*** 
0.1553 4.70*** 
0.0039 1.95* 
0.0029 1.17 
-O.OI04 -0 .22 
-0 .0877 -0 .93 
0.0095 1.71 * 
0.0055 1.25 
0.0653 1.84* 
-0.0532 -1.08 
-0.0616 -2.64*** 
-0 .85I7 -3 .22*** 
0.52 

28 

84 

p<0.05) . This finding implies that the ownership structure 
of an IPO does not seem to influence the level of the 
accrual or cash flow components of earnings. 
The CEO as the chairman of the board 
(CEOCHAIR)does not seem to influence the firm's 
earnings and cash flow component, and it only marginally 
affects the accrual component (t=-1.94, p<O. I ). However, 
the fact that the CEO is the founder of the company 
(CEOFOUND) has a negative and significant effect on the 
firm's earnings (t=-3 .6I, p<O.OI) and cash flow component 
(t=-2.96, p<0.01), but not the accrual component. This 
latter finding indicates that if the founder is the CEO of the 
firm, the firm tends to earn less than firms with a non­
founder CEO . We also find that CEO tenure 
(CEOTENUR) has a positive impact on earnings (t=3.71 , 
p<O.OI) and both the accrual and cash flow components 
(t=2.59 and t=2.5I, respectively). This suggests that CEO 
tenure represents the CEO human capital and experience 
that is important to boost earnings in the newly public 
firms. 
After controlling for other factors, we find that older 
(YRFOUND) and larger (LOGASSET) firms tend to have 
higher earnings (t=3.98 and t=3 . I9, respectively) since it 
has a higher cash flow component (t=3.57 and t=3.74, 
respectively) . IPO firms that conduct a primary seasoned 
equity offering (SEO) after the IPO tend to have a larger 
accrual component (t=3 .54, p<O.OI) and, therefore, higher 
earnings (t=2 .15, p<0.05). We observe that the firms ' 
earnings have declined over the period following the IPO 
(as indicated by the time TREND variable). One additional 
year after the IPO reduces the firm's earnings and cash flow 
component by 5.5 cents and 4.3 cents, respectively. We do 
not find the same decaying trend of the firms' accrual 
component in the full sample .3 
Multiple Regression Results for Top Quartile Sample. 
The results presented in Tables I and 2 indicate that there 
are significant differences in earnings, accruals, cash flows, 
and corporate governance mechanisms between firms in the 
top and bottom quartiles of earnings. To further investigate 
these differences, we separately perform our regression 
analysis on the top and bottom quartile subsamples . 
Table 4 reports the regression results for the top quartile 
subsample. We find that the percentage of outside directors 
(ODPCTBOD) is negatively related to earnings and the 
accrual component (t=-2.76 and t=-5.7, respectively), but 
positively related to the cash flow component (t=2.69, 
p<O.O I). This evidence suggests that more independent 
boards inhibit management from manipulating earnings 
through accruals and from over-investing surplus cash . 
Similar to the results for the full sample (Table 3), we find 
that the number of audit committee members (AUDCOM) 
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TABLES 

MULTIPLE REGRESSION RESULTS FOR BOTTOM QUARTILE SAMPLE 

Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 
Earnings Accrual 9omponent Cash Flow Component 
Variables Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
BODSIZE 0.0063 0.31 -0.0009 -0.09 0.0073 0.35 
ODPCTBOD 0.0062 2.03** 0.0006 0.33 0.0056 1.85* 
AUDCOM -0.0395 -0.36 0.0167 0.22 -0 .0562 -0.55 
COMPCOM -0.1227 -1.75* -0.0025 -0.04 -0.1203 -1.58 
EXTBLOCK 0.0056 2.33** 0.0015 1.03 0.0041 1.56 
TOTCEOWN 0.0103 2.33** 0.0013 0.86 0.0091 1.93* 
CEO CHAIR 0.0240 0.39 0.0207 0.55 0.0033 0.05 
CEO FOUND -0 .1141 -1.07 -0.0267 -0.60 -0.0874 -0.81 
CEOTENUR -0 .0619 -1.99** -0 .0025 -0.22 -0.0594 -1.97** 
YRFOUND 0.0565 2.99*** 0.0076 0.70 0.0489 2.48** 
LOGASSET 0.0839 2.09** -0.0086 -0.40 0.0925 2.37** 
SEO 0.1385 1.72* 0.0153 0.34 0.1232 1.33 
TREND -0 .0109 -0.33 0.0098 0.51 -0.0207 -0 .56 
INTERCEPT -0.5406 -1 .26 -0.2184 -0.70 -0.3222 -0.83 
R-square 0.67 0.30 0.64 
Total firms 28 28 28 
Observations 84 84 84 
The estimated slope coefficients for the industry dummies (2-digit SIC) are not reported. 
* p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p<0.01 
has a negative association with earnings and the cash flow 
component (t=-2.02 and t=-3 .04, respectively) . Its positive 
impact on the accrual component is only marginally 
significant at the 10 percent level (t= 1.71 ). The number of 
compensation committee members (COMPCOM), like the 
full sample, has an opposing effect on earnings, accruals, 
and cash flows . 
We find that the external blockholders' ownership 
(EXTBLOCK) is negatively related to the accrual 
component (t=-2.34, p<0 .05), but only marginally 
positively associated w~th the cash flow component (t= 1.95, 
p<0. 1). We find that CEO ownership (TOTCEOWN) is 
marginally related with the accrual component of earnings 
(t=-1.68, p<O.l). This implies that a higher ownership 
concentration in the hands of external blockholders 
increases earnings through the cash flow component and it 
reduces the potential for earnings management through 
accruals. This finding is consistent with the extant 
literature that external blockholders have a strong incentive 
to monitor the manager's efforts to increase the firm ' s 
earnings through real activities that boost the firm's cash 
flow rather than manipulating earnings through accruals. 
We find that CEO characteristics (CEOCHAIR, 
CEOFOUND, AND CEOTENUR) do not significantly 
affect earnings and the components of earnings in the top 
quartile subsample. IPO firms that conduct seasoned equity 
offerings (SEO) are likely to increase the accrual 
component (t=3.75, p<0.01), but not the cash component or 
total earnings. We observe that over time (TREND 
variable) the earnings of the top quartile firms decrease 
since their cash flow component of earnings decreases after 
the IPO (t=-3.71 and t=-2 .64, respecitively) . This finding is 
consistent with Loughran and Ritter (1997) who find a 
long-run decrease in operating performance of IPO firms. 
Multiple Regression Results for Bottom Quartile 
Sample. Table 5 reports the regression results for the 
bottom quartile subsample. We find that the proportion of 
outside directors (ODPCTBOD) is positively related to 
earnings (=2.03, p<0.05) and the cash flow component 
(t=l.85, p<0.1), but these results are weaker compared to 
the top quartile subsample . In contrast to the top quartile, 
we find that outside directors have no effect on the accrual 
component for the bottom quartile (t=0.33). We also find 
that both the audit (AUDCOM) and compensation 
(COMPCOM) committees do not have a significant effect 
on earnings and the components of earnings. We find that 
the poor performance of the firms in the bottom quartile 
persists during the period after the IPO and do not have the 
opportunity to manage their earnings through accruals. 
Therefore, outside directors and the audit and compensation 
committees do not have as important a role in monitoring 
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management's actions in the bottom quartile firms as in the 
top quartile firms. 
We fmd that external blockholding (EXTBLOCK) is 
positively related with earnings . (t=2.33, p<0.05), but not 
the components of earnings. In addition, CEO ownership 
(TOTCEOWN) is positively associated with earnings 
(t=2.33, p<0.05) and the cash flow component (t=l.93, 
p<O.l). Interestingly, we find that CEO tenure 
(CEOTENUR) has a negative association with earnings and 
cash flows (t=-1.99, and t=-1.97, respectively). We also 
fmd that older and larger firms tend to have higher earnings 
(t=2,99 and t=2.09, respectively) through the cash flow 
component (t=2.48 and t=2.37, respectively). The earnings 
and components of earnings for the bottom quartile firms 
do not change over the two years after the IPO (TREND 
variable). 
Overall, we find that board structure, ownership 
structure, and CEO characteristics have less influence on 
earnings and the components of earnings for the bottom 
firms. This is probably due to the bottom quartile firms 
having persistently negative earnings and, therefore, do not 
have the ability to manipulate earnings through accruals or 
cash flows . We find that the bottom quartile firms are 
influenced primarily by their age and size. 
Conclusion 
In this study, we investigate earnings persistence in IPO 
firms by examining the accrual and cash flow components 
of earnings. We also analyze the impact of corporate 
governance mechanisms on earnings and the · two 
components of earnings. We analyze the full sample and 
two subsamples of the firms that are in the highest and 
lowest quartiles of earnings. 
We fmd that the strong positive earnings reported by the 
top quartile firms in the IPO year do not persist during the 
two subsequent years. This decline is due to the 
deterioration of the accrual component of earnings from 
positive in the IPO year to negative in the second year after 
the IPO. In contrast, the negative earnings reported by the 
bottom quartile firms remain fairly consistent from the IPO 
year through the second year following the lPO. 
We find that the percentage of outside directors is 
negatively related to earnings and the accrual component 
for the full sample and top quartile firms . In addition, a 
positive relation is found for the cash flow component for 
the top quartile. This suggests that more independent boards 
inhibit the manipulation of earnings through accruals and 
the over-investment of surplus cash for firms with strong 
positive earnings. Contrary to this, a positive association is 
found between earnings and the percentage of outside 
directors for firms in the bottom quartile. This latter finding 
suggests that the role of outside directors is different for 
firms with weak (negative) earnings. 
Interestingly, we find that the audit and compensation 
committees have differing (opposing) roles in relation to the 
firm's earnings and its components. We fmd a negative 
relation between the number of audit committee members 
and earnings and the cash flow component. This suggests 
that an increase in audit committee members may cause 
managers to become more conservative in accounting 
reporting of real profits through cash flows. In contrast, we 
find a positive association between the number of 
compensation committee members and earnings and the 
cash flow component. The compensation committee 
rewards managers for earning real profits (pay-for­
performance), thus resulting in higher earnings from the 
cash flow component. These results are found for the full 
sample and top quartile firms, but not for the bottom 
quartile firms. 
We find that external blockholders' ownership is 
negatively related to the accrual component of earnings but 
has no relation to total earnings for the top firms. However, 
for the bottom firms, external blockholders' ownership 
positively affects total earnings, but not the components of 
earnings. Similarly, CEO ownership has no relation to 
earnings or its components for the top quartile firms, but 
has a positive association to earnings for the bottom quartile 
firms. This is probably due to the differing ownership 
structures between the top and bottom firms. 
We find that CEO characteristics have no relation to 
earnings and its components for firms in the top quartile, 
and only CEO tenure is negatively related to earnings and 
cash flows for the bottom quartile. We also find that firm 
age and size is positively associated with earnings and cash 
flows for the bottom firms, but not the top firms. 
Lastly, we find IPO firms that conduct a SEO tend to 
have a larger accrual component of earnings. This finding 
renders further investigation on whether firms that decide to 
raise capital through equity issues do in fact manipulate 
their earnings during the issuance period . Future research 
can investigate the potential for earnings management 
through the accrual component when firms decide to come 
back to the capital market by issuing new equity. 
Endnotes 
1 The two years after the IPO peak period (1998-1999) are 
just prior to the stock market crash of March 2000. We 
limit our sample to this period so as not to contaminate our 
findings with the impact of the stock market downturn in 
the United States in the years following our sample period. 
2 We replace the natural log of total assets with the natural 
log of total sales in the regression equations to test whether 
our results are caused by spurious correlations between the 
dependent variables (that have assets as the denominator) 
and the log of assets as an independent variable. We find 
that our reported results remain robust with the log of total 
sales as a measure ofthe firm's economies of scale. 
3 We do not report the slope coefficients for the two-digit 
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industry dummies. We fmd that several industries have 
significantly higher earnings due to a higher accrual 
component (i.e., metal mining, electrical and transportation 
equipment, wholesale trade, and home furnishing). Other 
industries such as apparel stores, amusement service, social 
service and engineering and management service, have 
higher earnings due to a higher cash flow component. 
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